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 Subjectship, Citizenship, and the
 Long History of Immigration Regulation
 ROBERT J. STEINFELD
 Kunal Parker's "State, Citizenship, and Territory" can be read in at least two
 ways. Read one way, it tells an important story about how regulation of the
 poor was driven upward in Massachusetts during the nineteenth century,
 from the localities to the state. In the seventeenth century, Massachusetts
 had imposed primary responsibility for care of the poor on its towns. But
 during the eighteenth century, with the growth of a landless, wandering pop-
 ulation, town poor relief budgets came under increasing pressure. The towns
 responded by lobbying the Massachusetts legislature to pass a series of stat-
 utes that made it more and more difficult to acquire a town settlement. Peo-
 ple who fell into need in Massachusetts but who had not acquired a town
 settlement became state paupers for whom the state, rather than any town,
 was fiscally responsible. As it became more and more difficult to acquire a
 town settlement, the number of state paupers increased, shifting a portion
 of the fiscal burden of poor relief from the towns onto the state.
 From the state's perspective the poor relief system created perverse in-
 centives for the towns. Because the towns actually administered the poor
 relief system for both town paupers and state paupers, they had every in-
 ducement to exaggerate the number of state paupers, for whose expenses
 they were reimbursed, and to understate the number of town paupers, for
 whom they remained fiscally responsible. This system also gave towns little
 incentive to remove state paupers to the places where they might have a
 settlement, and where they would once again become town paupers since
 towns were completely reimbursed for the state pauper expenses they bore.
 As overseas immigration picked up in the 1820s and 1830s, the number
 of state paupers grew, placing greater fiscal pressures on the state, which the
 conduct of the towns only served to exacerbate. Gradually, the state was
 forced into assuming greater and greater oversight of the towns and began
 Robert J. Steinfeld is Professor of Law at the State University of New York at
 Buffalo.
 Law and History Review Fall 2001, Vol. 19, No. 3
 ? 2001 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
 Law and History Review, Fall 2001
 to take over and directly administer some of the functions for which the towns
 had previously been responsible. State regulation grew as the state wrested
 administrative authority away from the localities. But the motivation for this
 transfer of authority was not a desire to expand state power; it was a desire
 to avoid fiscal imposition by the towns. A more powerful state was, in a sense,
 the unintended consequence of these acts of fiscal self-defense.
 Versions of this story have been told before but in the majority of earli-
 er accounts, the state's expanded role in poor relief has simply been as-
 cribed to the growth of an unsettled population. Parker's account adds a
 crucial political dimension to this heretofore almost entirely demographic
 story. Read this way, the article contributes important insights into the pro-
 cesses that drove regulation of the poor upward from the towns to the state
 in the nineteenth century.
 Read a second way, however, the article seeks to tell a more ambitious story
 of the development of American citizenship as a gesture of refusal or exclu-
 sion rather than as the unfolding of national identity. Essentially, Parker's
 argument is that the same processes that led Massachusetts to defend itself
 against fiscal imposition by the towns also led it to begin to defend itself
 against the demands of immigrants. The great wave of immigration into
 Massachusetts from the 1820s to the 1850s led to a huge increase in the
 number of state paupers, and of these a growing proportion were immigrants.
 The Commonwealth reacted by beginning to use citizenship as a device
 for limiting the claims of immigrants to enter and remain on Massachu-
 setts territory and to seek support from the community when they fell into
 need. Massachusetts began to limit entry to its territory by enacting the
 Passenger Acts. It limited the rights of immigrants to remain on its terri-
 tory by invoking various provisions in its Poor Law. Immigrants who sought
 poor relief could be sent back to their points of origin. These acts of re-
 fusal were accompanied by the development of a state discourse that sought
 to portray immigrants as alien other in order to justify restrictions on their
 territorial and welfare claims.
 Parker argues that this was a new development. By contrast, during the
 eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, before Massachusetts had to
 contend with a large immigrant population, the right to enter and remain
 on Massachusetts territory had not been tied to citizenship but to town
 settlement, had not been controlled by the state but by the localities. The
 territorialization of the boundaries of Massachusetts was new, as was the
 linkage of both territorial rights and rights of support to citizenship. And
 these developments could be traced to the success the towns had earlier had
 in shifting responsibility for poor relief onto the state and to the fiscal
 difficulties this shift created for the state when it began to have to deal with
 the effects of a large wave of immigration.
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 This argument seems completely plausible, knowing what we do of the
 ugly nativism that developed in Massachusetts during this period. But there
 is other evidence that Parker does not discuss which suggests that his ar-
 gument may exaggerate the novelty of the steps Massachusetts took in the
 1830s and 1840s to deal with immigrants and the novelty of the state dis-
 course used to justify these steps.
 Massachusetts had long been concerned with the quality and character
 of arriving immigrants. In the eighteenth century, the colony passed a se-
 ries of laws to address these problems. And Massachusetts was not alone.
 Other colonies also passed laws to deal with problems that dissolute, in-
 firm, and aged immigrants might create and to limit the entry of certain
 groups of aliens who were considered particularly undesirable. A number
 of these colonial laws created bonding and fee schemes that were strikingly
 similar to the ones in the Passenger Acts. The Passenger Acts seem to have
 represented the culmination of an older tradition of immigration regulation
 rather than the beginning of a new one. They appear to look backward rather
 than forward to the harsher, more comprehensive schemes that began to
 be established with the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882.
 This evidence also suggests different motives for the late eighteenth-
 century Massachusetts law that Parker discusses in his article. It indicates
 that by the end of the eighteenth century there was a well-established tra-
 dition of using citizenship (subjectship) as refusal and that this older tra-
 dition found expression in the settlement act of 1794 and in the Massachu-
 setts alien real property disability.
 In a number of colonies and later states, statutes were enacted during
 the eighteenth century that put into place immigration regulations similar
 to the ones later adopted in the Passenger Acts.
 In Massachusetts, statutes were passed, beginning in 1701, to prevent the
 landing of the "poor, vicious and infirm," laws that required the master of each
 vessel to post a bond that towns receiving any "lame, impotent, or infirm
 persons, incapable of maintaining themselves ... would not be charged with
 their support." In the absence of this security, the captain was to return such
 passengers to their port of embarkation.'
 This provision was renewed in 1723, 1725, and 1757. Other colonies sought
 to restrict the entry of Catholics, Irish, Germans, and other aliens. In Penn-
 sylvania, the immigration of a large number of Germans in 1727 created
 fears that these "strangers" who were "ignorant of our Language & Laws"
 1. Marilyn Baseler, "Asylum For Mankind": America, 1607-1800 (Ithaca: Cornell Univer-
 sity Press, 1998), 71-72.
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 would create grave problems for the Commonwealth. In 1729, as a result,
 Pennsylvania enacted a law that
 levied a duty of forty shillings on "every person being an alien born out of
 the allegiance of the King of Great Britain ... coming into this province by
 land or water" and twenty shillings on "any Irish servant or passenger upon
 redemption."2
 In Maryland in the early eighteenth century the legislature passed an act
 that
 required the masters of vessels "or others importing Irish Servants into this
 Province by Land or by Water" to pay twenty shillings sterling "per poll." The
 purpose of this law, according to the act's title, was to raise "a Supply to defray
 the Public Charge... and... to prevent the Importing too great a number
 of Irish Papists into this Province." Similar steps were taken by Virginia's
 legislature ... [w]hen in 1699 the burgesses laid a duty of fifteen shillings
 on "every servant not born in England or Wales ...."3
 After the Revolution,
 Americans retained their colonial reluctance to serve as a regenerative haven
 for Europe's failures-men who would enervate rather than strengthen the
 new nation.... Postwar governments did their best to staunch the influx of
 infirm and dissolute immigrants. In 1788 Massachusetts reenacted colonial
 laws requiring the registration of foreigners and prohibiting the landing of
 aliens who were likely to need public relief.4
 From the beginning, Americans had a double-sided view of immigrants
 and immigration. On the one hand, they frequently saw immigrants as a
 critical source of future prosperity. On the other, they were concerned that
 only the right sort of immigrants should come into the country. After the
 Revolution, Massachusetts seems to have had a more restrictive immigra-
 tion policy than some other states. Indeed, one Massachusetts man com-
 plained that this restrictive policy would result in the state falling econom-
 ically behind other regions of the country. When, after the Revolution, a
 number of states abolished the alien real property disability in order to
 encourage immigration, Massachusetts did not.5 Indeed, Parker quotes from
 a 1785 Massachusetts bill that sought to reaffirm in the strongest terms the
 alien real property disability in the state.
 After the Revolution and through the 1790s the new nation engaged in
 a sweeping debate about alienage and the terms of naturalization. The
 Naturalization Act of 1795 and the Alien, Sedition and Naturalization Acts
 2. Ibid., 72-73.
 3. Ibid., 84.
 4. Ibid., 197.
 5. Ibid., 212 (economic effects), 218 (alien real property disability).
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 of 1798 were expressions of how deeply these issues exercised Americans
 during this period.
 Although most of the delegates to the Constitutional convention wished to
 avoid giving "the tincture of illiberality to the Constitution," none of them
 could completely shake the belief that foreigners "bring with them, not only
 attachments to other countries, but ideas of government so distinct from ours,
 that in every point of view they are dangerous."6
 "In 1795 Federalists and Republicans agreed that foreigners needed a long-
 er period of acculturation and closer scrutiny before entering America's
 political arena."7 A nephew of President John Adams wrote that "the grand
 cause of all our present difficulties may be traced... to so many hordes
 of Foreigners imigrating [sic]to America .. ."8 But after 1795 the Repub-
 lican and the Federalist Parties went separate ways and the Federalists
 began to embrace an even more robust nativism. In Massachusetts, the leg-
 islature was dominated and controlled by Federalists.
 Even after Jefferson was elected president in 1800, the Naturalization
 Act of 1802 continued to include many provisions found in the 1795 and
 1798 Federalist naturalization acts.
 Any immigrant arriving after the passage of the Act of 1802 was now required
 to present a certificate issued by a court clerk declaring that he had registered
 as an alien prior to petitioning for naturalization. This "alien report" record-
 ed a foreigner's name, birthplace, age, allegiance, country of origin, and in-
 tended place of settlement.... The registration of immigrants and resident
 aliens was a dramatic expansion of the power of government to intrude into
 the lives of America's immigrants.9
 There are three things that should be said about the Massachusetts Pas-
 senger Acts of the 1830s and 1840s and the discourse that was deployed
 to justify them. First, in their concern for the fiscal burdens that immigrants
 might impose on the Commonwealth and in the mechanisms they estab-
 lished to try to address this problem, they seem to have been completely
 traditional, harking back to schemes that had been used in various colo-
 nies since the eighteenth century.
 Second, the state discourse about the alien, corrupt character of foreign-
 ers that was used to justify the treatment of aliens during the 1830s and
 1840s does not seem to have been substantially different from discourses
 that had been used intermittently for over a century in connection with
 efforts to limit the immigration of Irish Papists, Germans, Jews, or post-
 French Revolutionary radicals. The precise character of the concerns ex-
 6. Ibid., 234.
 7. Ibid., 267.
 8. Quoted in ibid., 270. Emphasis in original.
 9. Ibid., 309.
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 pressed about foreigners in the nineteenth century may have been some-
 what different than the character of the concerns expressed in the eighteenth
 century, but over this period there was remarkable continuity in the impulse
 to portray the alien foreigner as other and to try to limit the immigration
 of certain groups on that ground.
 Third, the Passenger Acts do not seem to have been direct precursors of
 the harsher form of immigration regulation that began to be put into place
 during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. They did not refuse im-
 migrants entry into Massachusetts territory outright but conditioned entry
 upon the payment of a significant, but not prohibitive, $2 fee in many cas-
 es, or upon the posting of a $1000 bond in the case of the aged and infirm.
 This was a weak form of territorialization and a far cry from the modem
 regime of immigration, which took its final form during the 1920s. That
 regime flatly excluded (excludes) most immigrants from the country un-
 less they could (can) specially qualify under the law.
 Parker acknowledges that the Passenger Acts did not actually refuse
 immigrants entry into Massachusetts and represented only a weak form of
 territorialization but goes on to point out that Massachusetts did refuse
 immigrants rights to remain on its territory under Poor Law. And this is
 unquestionably true. Immigrants without a settlement in a Massachusetts
 town could be removed from the Commonwealth and sent overseas should
 they seek poor relief. But this gesture of refusal of territorial rights applied
 equally to immigrants and citizens. Any citizen who had not managed to
 establish a settlement in a Massachusetts town could also be removed to
 the place that was responsible for his support. Parker devotes several pag-
 es to describing how Massachusetts officials could, at times, work hard to
 return citizen paupers to the states from which they had come and which
 remained responsible for their support. One Massachusetts official, Park-
 er writes,
 assiduously visited neighboring states to investigate whether the responsibility
 for some state paupers might not be pinned onto governmental bodies there.
 In 1855, "to facilitate the discovery of [town] settlements of persons claim-
 ing support from the State, [this official] journeyed into Maine, New Hamp-
 shire, Vermont, Rhode Island and Connecticut, and ... found a home for one
 hundred and five [state] paupers."'0
 Citizens who had not managed to acquire a town settlement also stood
 upon exactly the same footing as aliens when it came to claims upon the
 community for support. Both were entitled to receive interim poor relief
 as Massachusetts state paupers so long as the state did not opt to remove
 10. Kunal Parker, "State, Citizenship, and Territory: The Legal Construction of Immigrants
 in Antebellum Massachusetts," Law and History Review 19 (2001): 634.
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 them to their places of origin. Indeed, even Massachusetts citizens could
 be removed to their towns of origin.
 Parker recognizes that the similarities in the treatment of citizen paupers
 without settlements and alien paupers create some difficulties for his ar-
 gument. His response is to urge that citizenship should be understood as a
 gesture of pure refusal, one that did not entail any notion that citizenship
 brought any particular advantages. But I find this argument difficult to
 accept. If we say that citizenship is a gesture of refusal, it must be to es-
 tablish that in some respects at least citizenship gives something that alien-
 age does not. If citizenship gives no more than alienage, it is not alienage
 against which the gesture of refusal operates but some other characteristic
 that citizen and alien share. In this case, the main gesture of refusal seems
 to have been one aimed at poor people without settlements in Massachu-
 setts towns, regardless of whether they were citizens or aliens. In the end,
 the case seems weak for seeing this particular refusal of territorial rights
 under Poor Law as one based on citizenship.
 Ironically, there are clear gestures of citizenship as refusal to be found
 in Massachusetts Poor Law, and in Massachusetts law generally, but they
 appear decades before the 1830s and 1840s. The 1794 Massachusetts Set-
 tlement Act, and the alien real property disability, which continued in ef-
 fect in Massachusetts long after the Revolution, excluded aliens from im-
 portant legal entitlements purely on the ground that they were not citizens.
 But Parker sees these earlier gestures not as gestures of citizenship as re-
 fusal but as more traditional gestures somehow not based on citizenship.
 The 1794 Massachusetts settlement act, for example, explicitly prohib-
 ited aliens from acquiring a town settlement by demonstrating that they
 were capable of supporting themselves. Parker argues that the statute was
 written as it was only because the towns feared that aliens, who could not
 own real property in Massachusetts, would pose a greater fiscal risk for
 towns than American citizens. The act of refusal contained in the statute
 was not anti-alien. It was simply anti a group of people who could not own
 real property and hence who could not achieve the economic self-sufficien-
 cy and political independence that ownership of real property was then
 thought to bring.
 Parker has not found direct evidence for this reading of the statute, and
 in light of what we know about an older tradition of using citizenship/sub-
 jectship as a gesture of refusal and of the Massachusetts legislature's strong
 Federalist, anti-immigrant posture during this period, a better reading of the
 statute, I think, would cast it as a clear gesture of citizenship as refusal.
 The 1794 statute continued to make the common law modes of acquir-
 ing a settlement available to aliens: marriage, serving an apprenticeship,
 serving as a town officer or minister, and so forth. But, as Parker rightly
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 points out, these were modes of acquiring a settlement that were not meant
 for the complete outsider. Complete outsiders could acquire a town settle-
 ment under the statute by demonstrating a capacity to support themselves
 over a period of time-but only if they were American citizens. American
 citizens could acquire a town settlement in Massachusetts by demonstrat-
 ing economic capacity in one of three ways: (1) through ownership of real
 property of a certain value for three years running, or (2) through owner-
 ship of an estate (personal property or mixed personal and real property)
 of a certain value for five years running, or simply (3) through residence
 for ten years together with tax paying for five years. Only the first method
 required ownership of real property.
 An American citizen could gain a town settlement under this statute
 without ever having owned real property. It is true that aliens were legally
 precluded from owning real property in Massachusetts, but they were not
 legally precluded from owning personal property or from paying taxes.
 They were in a legal position to demonstrate economic capacity under two
 of the three methods set out in the statute, but the statute expressly disqual-
 ified noncitizens from doing so.
 On its face the statute treated noncitizens differently from citizens and
 it strikes me that a less labored reading of the statute would be that it flatly
 precluded noncitizens from becoming members of Massachusetts town
 communities even if they could demonstrate economic capacity, a clear
 example of citizenship as refusal. This reading is strongly supported by
 what we know about the debates over alienage and naturalization that were
 taking place in the 1790s and about the posture of the Massachusetts leg-
 islature toward aliens during this period.
 Parker's reading of the 1794 statute, moreover, depends upon the fact
 that aliens were prohibited from owning real property in Massachusetts.
 But that raises the question why aliens were prohibited from owning real
 property in the state in the first place? Why was this disability itself not
 evidence of citizenship as a gesture of refusal? Parker seems to see the real
 property disability as a matter of pure tradition going back to English law,
 a tradition that had merely lingered on in Massachusetts. But the evidence
 suggests that the alien real property disability became a live issue after the
 Revolution. A number of states repealed the disability, hoping to encour-
 age immigration; Massachusetts did not. This was no mere lingering on of
 tradition, it was conscious post-Revolutionary Massachusetts policy aimed
 at protecting the Commonwealth from the undue influence of aliens.
 The difficulty with the main argument of this article, it seems to me, is
 that where it looks for citizenship as refusal in the middle decades of the
 nineteenth century, the explicit gestures of refusal it finds are not substan-
 tially different from gestures of refusal that Massachusetts and other colo-
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 nies had engaged in, on and off, for more than a century and that they had
 long justified on the ground that aliens (at least some aliens) were other.
 The Massachusetts policy of these decades seems to have represented the
 culmination of an older tradition of using citizenship/subjectship as refus-
 al rather than the beginning of a new one. And at times this older tradition
 had produced even harsher gestures of refusal than those that were to be
 found in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. I take the Massa-
 chusetts real property disability and the settlement act of 1794 to represent
 examples of this older tradition at its worst. Not until the last quarter of
 the nineteenth century did the regulation of immigration begin to take on
 a new, even harsher, more comprehensive form, one that would lead in the
 twentieth century to the thoroughgoing territorialization of the nation.
 Parker's real contribution is to lay bare some of the pressures that were
 responsible during the first decades of the nineteenth century for driving
 regulation of the poor upward, for leading the state to take away from the
 localities the administration of certain important aspects of poor relief and
 immigration policy. By contrast, the substantive policies that the state be-
 gan to administer during this period do not seem to have represented a
 marked departure from policies that had been utilized, intermittently, to
 manage immigration for over a century.
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